CRM Soc Update

Bruseker and Beretta / CRM Soc WG
24/6/21

Actors / Participants (so far)

symogih.org Project (LARHRA)

ETH Zurich (Chair for the History and Theory of Architecture - Prof. Maarten Delbeke): Art and Architectural Argumentation Project

Linked Conservation Data

Canadian Heritage Information Network (Actors Project)

Silknow ERC (LARHRA)

Following up the Intended Scope of CRM Base in an Extension for Social Facts

CIDOC CRM Base Goals and Scope

"The overall scope of the CIDOC CRM can be summarised in simple terms as the curated, factual knowledge about the past at a human scale…. The Intended Scope of the CIDOC CRM may, therefore, be defined as all information required for the exchange and integration of heterogeneous scientific and scholarly documentation about the past at a human scale and the available documented and empirical evidence for this." CIDOC CRM Specification 7.1.1, p. 10

The Empirical as Material?

"The primary role of the CIDOC CRM is to enable the exchange and integration of information from heterogeneous sources for the reconstruction and interpretation of the past at a human scale, based on all kinds of material evidence, including texts, audio-visual material and oral tradition." CIDOC CRM Specification 7.1.1, p. 10

Research in Humanities and Facts: Material and Social Fact

Researchers in humanities are not necessarily primarily interested in the collation of material facts but work up material facts in order to be able to understand and make accurate statements about or argue over questions of 'social fact'.

The interest in objects, events, persons and the potential objects of discourse enabled by CIDOC CRM does not usually end in laying out the bare spatial-temporal material relations but, rather, lays out these relations as a necessary foundation in order to be able to discuss the social valence and import of such facts, the intentional meaning invested in bare physical realities by individuals and collectives and how these change and interact over time.

We can call this investment of meaning into the material world 'social facts'.

Research in Humanities and the (non) Consolidation of Facts

Researchers in humanities are not simply interested in the latest, 'best state of knowledge' (not physical scientists), where that best state of knowledge is the consolidated view of an individual or group. So there is not an interested in finding the 'right' facts, but all the facts.

Rather humanists are interested in the evolution of forms of knowledge over time, space and groups, such that the temporality of facts matter.

Social facts differ from material facts which we can treat, for convenience, as absolute [X either was or was not at Place Y at Time Q]. Social facts depend on an agency for them to be held.

More than just material facts

Michael Leshner and Michael Stark became the first gay couple to wed in Canada, in a civil ceremony held immediately after an Ontario appeals court ruled the practice legal.

"These slogans will always be in my heart and those words will always stay on white paper, which will never disappear," said the man, who wore a mask and only gave his surname, Leung.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-art-idUSKBN2471DH

Paul Quassa, President of the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut, and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney signing the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, Iqaluit, May 1993

https://blogs.mcgill.ca/hist203momentsthatmatter/2018/04/06/creation-of-nunavut-1999/

& other Kinds of phenomena we want to be able to talk about

The name of the place designated as FYROM from 1991 by the Greek State

The name of the place designated as Macedonia from 1991 by the Macedonian State

The classification of certain apatosaurus and camarasaurus remains as 'Brontosaurus' for a period of time by the American Museum of Natural History

The function of St. Joe's Cathedral (Edmonton) as a minor basilica from 1984 for the Catholic community

The social status of Frierich Hegel as a Privatdozent at Jena University 1801-1805

The custodial status of G'psgolox totem pole as held by the Swedish National Museum of Ethnography for the Swedish State (1929-2006)

The ownership of the Euphronios Krater by the Moma 1972-2006 according to American law

The residential status of the Prime Minister Role at 24 Sussex Drive (1951-Present)

How to retain empirical objectivity when representing a social fact, what is its ontological status?

Challenge:

We do not want to enable 'poetry' or 'ideology' via our new classes, but to allow the representation of what objectively exists for some people at some time as some real, social (in the mind) phenomenon.

Otherwise put:

"There are portions of the real world, objective fact in the world, that are only facts by human agreement. In a sense there are things that exist only because we believe them to exist. I am thinking of things like money, property, governments, and marriages. Yet many facts regarding these things are 'objective' facts in the sense that they are not a matter of your or my preferences, evaluations or moral attitudes…. The question that has puzzled me is, how are institutional facts possible? … " Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, p.1-2

The Objective Subject: Intentionality and Collective Intentionality

NOT what I intend to do.

The basic disposition of mind.

Consciousness is ABOUT something.

The directedness of the mind towards something, in some way.

It enables us to represent the world.

Collective intentionality, a directedness of mind with a 'we' subject.

Figure 1.1

we intend

I intend & I believe that you believe that...

I intend & I believe that you believe that...

The alternative that I am proposing looks like this:

Figure 1.2

we intend

we intend

A Motor of Social Facts? Speech Acts

"It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact', which is must do either true or falsely." p.1

"In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it." p.6

Examples

- I do, in a wedding ceremony
- I name this ship
- I bequeath this item
- I bet x that y

Three Searlean elements for talking about social fact

X Counts as Y in C

The assignment of Function "Functions are never intrinsic but are always observer relative." pp.14

Collective Intentionality "Collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon that cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favour of something else."
"No set of 'I consciousnesses' even supplemented with beliefs, adds up to a 'We consciousness'" pp.24

Constitutive Rules "The key element in the move from the collective imposition of function to the creation of institutional facts is the imposition of a collectively recognized status to which a function is attached." pp.41

The General Propositions for CRM Soc

1. Social Fact understood as collective intentionality gives the ontological substance to subjectively grounded (requires consciousness and belonging to a group), but socially objective facts
2. Speech Acts understood as a well known means of generating social facts (not the exclusive means)
3. Social Collectives as bearers and context for collective intentional relations

Modelling of Social Fact, Example Name

New Classes and Properties

Institutional Fact / Social Connotation

An instance of institutional fact is an ascription of a status function to an object by a community. The institutional fact is a concretization of a collective intentionality of the community in question towards a certain object over a certain period. An instance of institutional fact is recognizable to a competent speaker/member of a symbolic community (native or learner with sufficient progress, e.g. anthropologist). An instance of institutional fact may not be perceived through a single sense impression but through multiple experiences and implicit reasonings (e.g.: the behaviour of a child to an elder, and linguistic evidence and interview), yet typically such intermediate observations and inferences are not necessarily recorded or accessible. The historical statement is typically the assertion of the institutional fact, that such and such a fact was the case, and in force, at some time. The epistemic veridicality of the stated /reference instance of institutional fact is always open to contestation. The means of contestation involve analyzing the sources which support it. Instances of institutional fact come into existence based on conventions establishing the conditions under which they come into effect. Typically, an instance of institutional fact will come into existence either because of the performance of its stipulated, initiating speech act (e.g.: state of being married via marriage) or as a result of events fulfilling existing norm prescriptions in the community (e.g.: state of being father as result of birth of child of sister). An institutional fact comes to be through the agreed fiat of a community. It typically ceases to exist either because of a stipulated, nullifying speech act (e.g. divorce proceeding), because a community ceases to support the effective rule supporting its declaration (e.g.: ownership of people) or force majeure (e.g.: object ascribed function/status or community perceiving status is eliminated).

Properties

ZP1 has intentional subject

ZP2 ascribes intentional target

ZP3 ascribes intentional relation

ZP4 holds for

Modelling of Speech Act as (de) Generator of Social Fact

New Classes and Properties

Institutional Fact / Social Connotation

An instance of speech act comprises an intentional activity engaged in by a set of actors to create a new institutional fact within a community. Speech acts are carried out through invoking a social rule and performing a prescribed set of actions often including the locution of set formulae. Correct execution of the speech act as specified by the rule results in the existence of new institutional facts. The substance of speech act is ritual action by a group. An instance of speech act begins when the intended ritual proceeding as specified by the rule invoked is initiated. The instance of speech act ends when the required set of actions specified for the action in question are executed or it is abandoned.

Properties

ZP39 invokes [D: ZE13, R:E29]

ZP40 performs [D: ZE13, R:E29]

ZP41 utters [D: ZE13, R:E33]

ZP42 intentionally initiates [D: ZE13, R:ZE1]

ZP52 intentionally terminates [D: ZE13, R:ZE1]

ZP53 initiates for [D:ZE13, R:E74]

Modelling of Collective Intentionality and Collectives

New Classes and Properties

Collective State of Mind

This class models the fact that a community or collective of humans shares or shared instances of C1 Social Representation. The fact of sharing social representations is what constitutes in the most general sense a human intentional collective or social context, besides relations of social power based on acceptance of collective rules. The social collective therefore exists insofar as it shares one or more social representations, be they understood in the sense of beliefs, abstract knowledge or applicable know-how. These are present in a human context at a given moment in time, or time-span, and constitute a social community in the broadest sense.

Social Representation

Social representations, as expression of collective intentionality, are sets of propositional objects and other related abstract objects that are present in human minds as a conceptualization shared by a social collective or social context, i.e. persons sharing the same point of view or conceptualization. These persons do not necessarily act together, and are therefore not a group in the sense of crm:E74 Group but they share the same social representations stemming from education, social context, professional and social engagement, media, etc. In this perspective, social representations (knowledge, beliefs and practical know-how) are constitutive of human communities and social collectives.

Social Collective

A set of persons sharing the same social representations, i.e. the same point of view or conceptualization on things in the world, or the same know-how and practical attitudes, without acting collectively and therefore without being an identifiable crm:E74 Group, but being generally aware of sharing these conceptualizations with other people and thus having a common social identity based on social representations

Properties

crmsoc:P1 has content (is content of) → crmsoc:C1 Social Representations

crmsoc:P2 is collective state of mind of (has collective state of mind) → crmsoc:C3 Social collective

And it works (it seems)

Examples from live CH debates in Canada NOW, working out real questions of Truth and Reconciliation that have important implications

- Renaming 'Grandin Station' in Edmonton in light of changing values
- Tracing Disputed Indigenous Ownership According to Different Groups
- Challenging Function and Meaning of Objects, representing the divergent social facts

Diagram Presentation of Examples